... it is difficult to imagine a more important guarantee of freedom to a democratic society than that of freedom of expression. A democracy cannot exist without the freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. These opinions may be critical of existing practices in public institutions and of the institutions themselves. However, change for the better is dependent upon constructive criticism. Nor can it be expected that criticism will always be muted by restraint. Frustration with outmoded practices will often lead to vigorous and unpropitious complaints. Hyperbole and colourful, perhaps even disrespectful language, may be the necessary touchstone to fire the interest and imagination of the public, to the need for reform, and to suggest the manner in which that reform may be achieved.
The concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies. Caustic and biting debate is, for example, often the hallmark of election campaigns, parliamentary debates and campaigns for the establishment of new public institutions or the reform of existing practices and institutions. The exchange of ideas on important issues is often framed in colourful and vitriolic language. So long as comments made on matters of public interest are neither obscene nor contrary to the laws of criminal libel, citizens of a democratic state should not have to worry unduly about the framing of their expression of ideas. The very lifeblood of democracy is the free exchange of ideas and opinions. If these exchanges are stifled, democratic government itself is threatened.
History has repeatedly demonstrated that the first step taken by totalitarian regimes is to muzzle the media and then the individual in order to prevent the dissemination of views and opinions that may be contrary to those of the government. The vital importance of freedom of expression cannot be overemphasized. It is important in this context to note that s. 2(b) of the Charter is framed in absolute terms, which distinguishes it, for example, from s. 8 of the Charter, which guarantees the qualified [page183] right to be secure from unreasonable search. The rights entrenched in s. 2(b) should therefore only be restricted in the clearest of circumstances.
Stated by Cory J in R. v. Kopyto (1987), 24 O.A.C. 81 and cited with approval by L'Heureux-Dube in Committed for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,  1 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.).
David G. Chow
Calgary Drug Lawyer
Calgary Criminal Defence Lawyers